

- 1 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : [] History on CIA's Origins

1. Following up on our discussion of 17 September about [] history, I propose that we proceed immediately to have the draft text read by a panel of persons who might advise as to its suitability for publication--initially in its present classified form--its dissemination outside the Agency, and possibly publication later on an unclassified basis.

2. As there are only three copies of the text at this point, to facilitate this process of review and make it available as background in OTR courses, I think it needs to be reproduced, as was [] earlier work, "COI and British Intelligence." (This latter publication won the Sherman Kent award of \$500 this year and is, I believe, an indicator of the high quality of [] history.) I am, therefore, sending the text of the history, the footnotes, bibliography etc. needed for a careful reading, to Printing and Photography Division for limited reproduction. OTR has invested considerably in this project, and I think that [] work--even in its present draft form--merits an opportunity to be read by an expert and objective group and to be available for reference in OTR courses.

3. Upon return from PPD, I would like to farm it out simultaneously to a number of readers. They might well be drawn from persons on the following list: John Warner, Angus Thuermer, L.K. White, Lawrence Houston, Sherman Kent, Hugh Cunningham, Walter Pforzheimer and [] I would also welcome any suggestions from you.

[]
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

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Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006400150004-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006400150004-4

DD/A Registry
File 0 + M 6

16 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : [] History on the Origins of CIA

REFERENCE: Memo to Asst. to the Director []
fr DDA, dtd 20 Aug 75, (DD/A 75-3930)

1. [] Deputy Director of Training, called today to inquire of the status of the history. I read to him Mr. Blake's 20 August memo addressed to [] [] said he was unaware of this final piece of correspondence.

2. Don feels the history is worth editing and correcting, and plans to discuss this with Messrs. Blake and McMahon sometime in the near future.

not publishing

[]
Executive Officer, DDA

Distribution:

✓ Orig - DDA Subject
1 - RFZ Chrono


EO-DDA [] (17 Sept 75)

SECRET

DD/A 75-3930

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director



1. I transmit to you as an attachment, a copy of "DONOVAN AND CIA--A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency", [redacted] I have attached to that document three memoranda:

(a) A memorandum to me from the Director of Training recommending that the history be published. I am not prepared to approve that recommendation at this time.


(b) A critique of the history made by Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer of the CIA History Staff.

(c) A position paper on the matter taken by Mr. Walt Elder.

I cannot judge the merits of the document and, indeed, I have not even read it. It came to my attention only yesterday. I am not sure if you are the proper individual to undertake the review in light of the intent of the Staff of the Senate Select Committee to prepare a history of CIA. In any event, I deposit it with you with the fullest confidence that you will know how to proceed with the matter--and as a contribution to your worthy cause.

(s) Jack (B)
John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

4 Atts:



SECRET

Distribution:

Original - Asst. to DCI [] w/Atts

25X1

- ✓ 1 - DD/A Subject w/all atts except history
- 1 - DD/A Chrono w/o Atts
- 1 - JFB Chrono w/o Atts

Attachment #1 - Copy (Notebook) [] History "Donovan and CIA
A History of the Establishment of the CIA" 25X1

(DD/A 75-3930/1)
Attachment #2 - D/OTR's Memo to DD/A dtd 29 July 75; Subj:
Publication of History on the Origins of CIA

(DD/A 75-3930/2)
Memo to Walter Elder (C/History Staff) from Jack B. Pfeiffer
dtd 13 August 1975; Subj: Publication of History on the
Origins of CIA


(DD/A 75-3930/3 - Memo to Associate DD/A from Walter Elder,
CIA Historian, dtd 19 August 1975; Subj: [] Text

25X1

DD/A:JFBBlake:der (20 August 1975)

ADMINISTRATIVE — INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/A 75-3930/1



29 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Director of Training

SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins
of CIA

1. Action Requested: [] has now completed the text of his paper, "Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA." This memorandum requests your approval to go forward with its publication in its classified form and your concurrence as to method of reproduction, number of copies, and their distribution as discussed below.

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2. Background: For approximately three and one-half years, [] has been working on this project, which was worked out by the then Director of Training, Hugh Cunningham, with the advice of Larry Houston and the approval of Colonel White. The text runs to approximately 600 typed pages, comprising sixteen chapters and an epilogue. It consists of a narrative account of the high-echelon events in the field of intelligence during the years 1940-47 that culminated in the establishment of CIA. The volume will be footnoted and will include an appendix of basic documents on the establishment and definition of functions of COI, OSS, NIA, CIG and CIA. It will be illustrated with charts and photographs, and will include a chronology of major events and a bibliography.

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3. In undertaking this work, [] investigated the documentary collections of government agencies, the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries, and the private collections of individuals such as General Donovan and Vice President Rockefeller. He consulted a number of individuals who played a key role in or had substantial insight into the events covered in the account, including Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Archibald MacLeish, James Roosevelt, Sir William S. Stephenson, General Louis J. Fortier, Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, Mrs. William J. Donovan, several members of the Donovan law firm in New York, and John Lockwood, long time legal adviser

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to Mr. Rockefeller. Based on this research and [] ability as a writer and historian as shown by his previous publication--"COI and British Intelligence: An Essay on Origins"--this paper stands, I believe, an excellent chance to be the definitive work on the subject and will earn the respect of all who read it.

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4. Staff Position: Many of the documents cited in the account were classified at their time of origin, although none is now higher than SECRET. Based upon the classification of the source materials, the volume will have to be classified SECRET, and I am requesting in a separate memorandum authority for [] to be eligible to classify at the TOP SECRET level in order that the exemption from downgrading of his SECRET history can be determined by him.

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5. The account will be of interest to defense and foreign affairs agencies, as well as to the various elements of the Intelligence Community. [] has received a great deal of cooperation from the archivists and librarians of other agencies who are interested in obtaining copies of the finished work for their collections. Given this interest and the nature of the work, I believe that it should be distributed to government organizations which have a reasonable interest and have arrangements for handling classified material at the SECRET level. Similarly, copies should be sent to the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries.

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6. Given this distribution inside government, I believe that we should handle the question of the Agency's sponsorship of the work in the same way that the JCS does with its histories. [] account is not an official history produced by CIA, but Agency support and sponsorship of it would be obvious to any reader. Accordingly, we would propose to preface the account with a statement of responsibility and sponsorship as follows:

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"This volume, though the product of official research, is the work of its author alone. It is to be construed as descriptive only and not as constituting the official position of the Director of Central Intelligence or of the Central Intelligence Agency."

7. There are two choices for reproducing the finished account. PSD has informally indicated to [] that printing would cost approximately \$5,200 and the offset

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method of reproduction approximately \$800. Despite the considerable variation in these two figures, I am in favor of having it printed because it would be more enduring and shorter, require fewer pages, and result in a more finished appearance than would the offset method.

8. It is difficult to know how many copies should be produced in order to meet the limited distribution discussed above. The cost factor involved in either printing or off-setting the work is not greatly affected by the number of copies produced. Inasmuch as producing too few copies to meet legitimate demands is much worse than ending up with a larger reserve of undistributed copies than one would normally prefer, I suggest that the producing run be set at 500. For purposes of comparison, 3,000 copies of Studies in Intelligence are currently being produced.

9. Recommendation: As discussed above, I recommend that [] account on the origins of the Agency be published as a classified document, that it be reproduced in 500 copies by OL/P&PD as a printed book, and that it be given distribution to other agencies having legitimate interest and such classified repositories as may be appropriate.

[]
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

Att.

CONCUR:

Chief, History Staff

Date

APPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

Date

Distribution:

0 - Adse (Ret. to DTR)

2 - DDA

1 - C/History Staff

2 - DTR

2 - OTR/II

-3-

OTR/II/[]nd (25 July 75)

DDA 75-3930/2

13 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walter Elder, Chief, CIA History Staff
FROM : Jack B. Pfeiffer
SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins of CIA
REFERENCE : Memorandum for DDA from DTR, 29 July 75,
same subject.

Background

1. Per your request to me of 1 August 1975, I have examined Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] It is unfortunate that the History Staff was not called on at a much earlier stage to provide guidance on the topic because a more "definitive" and certainly more professional history on the Origins of CIA -- including generous and adequately documented attributions to General William Donovan's contributions -- has been available since 1953. In December of that year [redacted] The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of National Policy, to 1950 appeared as the first issuance under the aegis of the CIA History Staff. [redacted] ten chapters cover 762 double-spaced pages, including footnotes; and the bulk of the first five chapters (345 pages) -- covering the wartime origins of the Agency through President Truman's signature on the National Security Act on 26 July 1947 -- were also published in five articles appearing in Studies in Intelligence between the Spring issue of 1968 and the Winter issue of 1969. Although [redacted] source references were not forwarded for review, I am sure that he must be aware of the [redacted] history.

2. Whereas [redacted] in his first 345 pages covers not only the push by Donovan for the establishment of an independent centralized intelligence agency but also provides considerable substantial information about the estimative process during

the immediate post-war period, the [] history consumes 557 single-spaced pages of text (excluding footnotes, appendixes, and other materials) in a grimly detailed, daily diary type of exposition of Donovan's every move in the organizational evolution of this period.

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Discussion

3. Continued in its present form, it is improbable (contrary to the belief expressed by [] of OTR in the memo forwarding the history) that [] volume has "an excellent chance to be the definitive work on the subject and will earn the respect of all who read it." As objective history, the work is notably biased. The author's admiration for Donovan leads him to impute the motives of practically everyone who opposed Donovan on any issue related to the objectives and nature of the organization best suited to serve the nation's intelligence needs; the author is so entranced with details of Donovan's involvement that he has not separated the wheat from the chaff -- each episode involving a "major" issue receives equal treatment; and too frequently the author's personal prejudices toward given individuals show through.

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4. Editorially the history is a mess. Its use of dates is consistently imprecise (of all things, the exact date on which President Truman signed the National Security Act (26 July 1947) is omitted in the textual discussion concerning the actual signing); the quantity of minutiae is almost unbearable -- the first 55 pages (possibly 65 pp.) would be fine for a Donovan biography, but are at best marginal to CIA's origins; the work is repetitious; and the numerous attempts to engage reader interest through the creation and destruction of straw men is unprofessional to say the least. Considering the problems of editing the text, one should look with fear and trepidation to the review of footnotes, sources, and other material intended for the "complete" version.

5. Both [] show that Donovan's insistence on a separate, centralized intelligence activity clearly made the function an integral part of US foreign policy formulation, but [] has placed considerably more emphasis on Donovan's concern that the intelligence Director receive "advice and assistance" from the representatives of the Departments of State, Army, and Navy rather than "advice and consent" of these representatives.

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6. One final general comment about the [] history is that the Epilogue is very much out of place in a history which could be construed by any stretch of the imagination as Agency-related. By this time, the author's opinion of former President Truman has already been made quite clear.

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Recommendations

7. Based on the above comments, I would recommend that no further work be done on the subject history. Three and a half years on this particular topic -- and the work not yet complete -- seems an inordinate waste of money. The source references, footnotes, and other related data should be gathered together and the complete package turned over to the CIA History Staff for retention as a manuscript for background use. As already mentioned, the bulk of the information in this history has appeared in print in a widely circulated, reputable intelligence publication, Studies in Intelligence. The pre-war background of COI, the more intimate view of the Donovan character, and details of the institutional infighting, can hardly be considered as significant additions to the literature of intelligence, particularly in view of the cost and effort which would be required to ready this volume for publication.

8. If the recommendation in Par. 7, above, is not acceptable to OTR and if that Office still wishes to publish the subject history then I would recommend that:

a. OTR negotiate a contract to turn the work over to a very competent and experienced editor with instructions to severely reduce the length, carefully check the documentation, eliminate the obvious author biases, and make the history conform to the standards and format established by the CIA History Staff.

b. When completed and approved by the CIA History Staff, the report should then be handled like any other of the volumes in the Agency historical program. Considering the availability and distribution of the already mentioned history by [] it would appear that three to five Xerox copies of the [] history would be adequate to meet the needs of the Agency; and its dissemination should be restricted to the

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Agency. By no stretch of the imagination should the ensuing volume be reproduced either by printing or by offset, nor should distribution be made outside the Agency.

c. If the procedures above are followed, the history will properly become a part of the official Agency history program and, as such, no disclaimers regarding the author's responsibility will be required.

9. To my knowledge, [] if available, would be the most qualified editor for this task. I would suggest that at least a three-month contract would be required for this job. [] or any other OTR editor should be made directly responsible to the CIA History Staff.

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10. As some indication of the need for thorough editing, I have attached a list of typographical errors, sins of omission and commission, and other questions that were noted in a quick review of the history.

[]

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA History Staff

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Attachment

ATTACHMENT

Editorial Comments

Pp. 1-65. Practically all of this section should be deleted. The high points of Donovan's exposure to the British service should be incorporated in the subsequent discussion.

In this same segment it is apparent that the paucity of complete dates is going to plague the reader through the remainder of the history. Phrases such as "that same day," "two days later," and "the next night" appear in this and subsequent segments of the text. Also the spelling out of dates has been employed in numerous instances for no apparent reason. The most certain and positive assurance of correct dates is the format followed by the History Staff (and the Agency) of day, month, and year.

Page 70, par. 3. Loose and confusing paragraph referring to the initial Stephenson-Donovan contact. The paragraph refers to an incident detailed on p. 49 of this history, concerning an event of 1944. The paragraph should be rewritten and specific dates used. Also, if the comment about a Donovan "No" does not concern the reader of this history, when why introduce the issue?

Page 71, lines 1-2. " . . . asked by a CIA historian . . ."
Asked by a CIA historian in 1959?

Page 72, par. 1. "Big" and "Little" Bills -- who was which?

Page 72, par. 3, line 5. Refers to memorandum."
Specify which memorandum.

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Page 75, par. beginning "But did Donovan . . ." Should line 6 read as it does, "early in life he had taken a military bride"? Or should it read, "early in life he had taken the military as a bride"?

Pages 78/79. Omission at end of page 78.

Page 79, line 12. Identify

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Page 79. Use numerals throughout for dates.

Page 87, 4th par., last sentence and 5th par. Since 4th par. ends on speculation about the subject Stimpson had in mind, the reference in the 5th par. to "talking over the matter" is ambiguous. What matter? Also there is an incomplete quote beginning in the first sentence of the 5th par.

Page 89, par. 3, line 1. "Still on the third . . ." This is one of many examples of an incomplete and confusing date.

Page 115, line 5. Typo. "CIA" should be "CIAA."

Page 117, line 8 up. Refers to MacLeish as an "intermediary between Donovan and Rockefeller." Has Rockefeller been introduced to the reader prior to this?

Page 130, 1st complete par. Rather cavalier treatment of Mr. Wallace Phillips. Needs some better explanation than that the Brits "distrusted him."

Page 131, last sentence. This sounds like the "Perils of Pauline." End the last sentence after the word "chapter."

Page 191, line 4. Why the "[sic]" following the word "typing"?

Page 191, par. 3, line 1. Change from " . . . but nary a word" to " . . . but without a word."

Page 211, last word. "practise" to "practice."

Page 220, par. 2, line 6. " . . . members did not become seized of the subject." There have been innumerable seizures to this point, and many more follow. Overworking the word.

Page 246, sec. 4, par. 1. Makes very positive statements about Davis and Sherwood conversation with FDR, particularly in light of the comment that "there is no account of the discussion."

Pages 253-261. This reads like a daily diary for period from 16 February 1943 through 15 March 1943.

- Page 263. The subtitle, "P. S. 1 -- Another Revision" is meaningless to the reader. What does P. S. 1 mean? P. S. 2 (p. 266)?
- Page 266, last sentence subsection 7. The reference to the Field Manual completely fails to indicate if this was revised as recommended by the Joint Planners (p. 265) or whether Donovan completely ignored the recommendation in view of the revision of JCS 155/7/10.
- Page 266, subsection 8, 1st sent. The date of the Donovan-Eisenhower-Davis luncheon needs to be restated for the benefit of the reader.
- Page 270, pars. 1-4. Delete.
- Page 282, line 1. Uses word "Bureau" to indicate Bureau of the Budget. BOB is the standard short reference inasmuch as most readers relate "Bureau" with the FBI.
- Page 283, 2nd complete par. From "sumbitting" to "submitting."
- Page 283, par. 3, lines 6-8. [] makes a straw man to show "how" a Donovan memorandum evolved -- [] focuses more on "what" evolved. STATINTL
STATINTL
- Page 311, line 1. From "intelligen8e actifities" to "intelligence activities."
- Page 322, line 7 up. From "that and effort" to "that any effort"
- Page 322, line 7 up. From "provoked" to "provoke." STATINTL
- Page 388, 2nd complete par., line 10. Is name [] correct?
- Page 388, last par., 1st sent. Delete phrase "whetting our appetites."
- Page 404, line 7. "Depreciated" or "deprecated"?
- Page 409, 1st complete par., last sent. Delete phrase "Recovering from the bouleversement."
- Page 458. Another brief summary for the reader. If the history were less cluttered with insignificant detail, perhaps these frequent recapitulations would be unnecessary.

Page 469, par. 3, line 6. If the author believes that Donovan was ". . . master in his own house," why did he write several hundred pages telling of Donovan's trials and tribulations?

Page 470, par. 2, line 4. Reference to "Air Force" should read "Army Air Force."

Pages 472-3. The reference to the time that the Daily Summary was delivered to President Truman suggests that Arthur Krock of the NYT was a more reliable source than Montague who headed the Reports Staff. Suggest the author clarify this for the reader.

Page 474, line 11. Another reference to what pleased Arthur Krock. So what? Since the author is so interested in the minutia of origins, does the fact that Krock was commenting on classified publications indicate the origin of the NYT access to classified government documents?

Page 497, subsection 4, par. 2. This is one of a number of instances in which the author reverts to the newsman's technique of suggesting ulterior motive by innuendo, without evidence or indication of why such question is posed. In the referenced paragraph, lines 7-9 provide such an example with respect to a meeting on 8 January 1947 between Senator Vanderberg and Clark Clifford to discuss statutory legislation establishing the NIA and CIG. However, the facts subsequently reported by the author (pp. 497-98) provide a straightforward explanation of the Truman administration's position on the NIA-CIG issue.

Page 553 ff. Delete Epilogue.

SECRET

2012-393013

Review Staff: 75/2500
19 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : [] Text

1. There is already a definitive history on the origins of CIA. It is [] "The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of National Policy, to 1950." It has been available since 1953.

2. [] text is filled with admiration for General Donovan to the point where those who dared to disagree are derogated. The material seems better suited as a working draft for a biography of General Donovan. Even if it were to become that, it would require rigorous editing.

3. The "Epilogue" is entirely out of place in anything purporting to be Agency-related.

4. No Agency histories have been circulated outside the Agency to date. This text does not even qualify for internal dissemination.

5. Had the author come to the historian earlier, we would have offered him the following guidance: What are you planning to do that [] has not done already? Would you like a copy of our guide for format, etc.? Please submit the draft (when finished) along with source references, footnotes, and research data for editing. Hopefully, rigorous editing might turn this into an issuance as part of the Agency history program. As a practical matter, the historian has no resources with which to work.

6. The historian cannot agree to the spending of any more money on this project. If the material is turned over to the historian, we shall make it available as background information.

[]
Walter Elder
CIA Historian

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006400150004-4

TO: MR. JACK PFEIFFER
C/HISTORY STAFF

FROM: Intelligence Community Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
[REDACTED]
Washington, D.C. 20505

25X1

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

INFORMATION

ACTION

RETENTION

LOAN

CONTROL NUMBER

COPY NO.

DOC. DATE

SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)

CLASS.

PUBLICATION OF HISTORY ON THE
ORIGINS OF CIA PLUS A GREEN NOTEBOOK
DONOVAN AND CIA A HISTORY OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF CIA.

DATE SENT 4 AUG 75

RECEIPT

SIGNATURE (acknowledging receipt of above documents)

RETURN TO



INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 6E-2914
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DATE OF RECEIPT

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Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006400150004-4

DD/A 75-3930/1



28 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM : Director of Training
SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins
of CIA

1. Action Requested: [] has now completed the text of his paper, "Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA." This memorandum requests your approval to go forward with its publication in its classified form and your concurrence as to method of reproduction, number of copies, and their distribution as discussed below.

STAT

2. Background: For approximately three and one-half years, [] has been working on this project, which was worked out by the then Director of Training, Hugh Cunningham, with the advice of Larry Houston and the approval of Colonel White. The text runs to approximately 600 typed pages, comprising sixteen chapters and an epilogue. It consists of a narrative account of the high-echelon events in the field of intelligence during the years 1940-47 that culminated in the establishment of CIA. The volume will be footnoted and will include an appendix of basic documents on the establishment and definition of functions of COI, OSS, NIA, CIG and CIA. It will be illustrated with charts and photographs, and will include a chronology of major events and a bibliography.

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3. In undertaking this work, [] investigated the documentary collections of government agencies, the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries, and the private collections of individuals such as General Donovan and Vice President Rockefeller. He consulted a number of individuals who played a key role in or had substantial insight into the events covered in the account, including Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Archibald MacLeish, James Roosevelt, Sir William S. Stephenson, General Louis J. Fortier, Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, Mrs. William J. Donovan, several members of the Donovan law firm in New York, and John Lockwood, long time legal adviser

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to Mr. Rockefeller. Based on this research and [] ability as a writer and historian as shown by his previous publication--"COI and British Intelligence: An Essay on Origins"--this paper stands, I believe, an excellent chance to be the definitive work on the subject and will earn the respect of all who read it.

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[]
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

Att.

CONCUR:

Chief, History Staff

Date

APPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

Date

Distribution:

0 - Adse (Ret. to DTR)
2 - DDA
1 - C/History Staff
2 - DTR
2 - OTR/II
OTR/II/[]nd (25 July 75)

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OTR Registry

75/5103

20 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM : Director of Training
SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins
of CIA

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3. In undertaking this work, [] investigated the documentary collections of government agencies, the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries, and the private collections of individuals such as General Donovan and Vice President Rockefeller. He consulted a number of individuals who played a key role in or had substantial insight into the events covered in the account, including Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Archibald MacLeish, James Roosevelt, Sir William S. Stephenson, General Louis J. Fortier, Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, Mrs. William J. Donovan, several members of the Donovan law firm in New York, and John Lockwood, long time legal adviser

STAT

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to Mr. Rockefeller. Based on this research and [] ability as a writer and historian as shown by his previous publication--"COI and British Intelligence: An Essay on Origins"--this paper stands, I believe, an excellent chance to be the definitive work on the subject and will earn the respect of all who read it.

STAT

4. Staff Position: Many of the documents cited in the account were classified at their time of origin, although none is now higher than SECRET. Based upon the classification of the source materials, the volume will have to be classified SECRET, and I am requesting in a separate memorandum authority for [] to be eligible to classify at the TOP SECRET level in order that the exemption from downgrading of his SECRET history can be determined by him.

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5. The account will be of interest to defense and foreign affairs agencies, as well as to the various elements of the Intelligence Community. [] has received a great deal of cooperation from the archivists and librarians of other agencies who are interested in obtaining copies of the finished work for their collections. Given this interest and the nature of the work, I believe that it should be distributed to government organizations which have a reasonable interest and have arrangements for handling classified material at the SECRET level. Similarly, copies should be sent to the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries.

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6. Given this distribution inside government, I believe that we should handle the question of the Agency's sponsorship of the work in the same way that the JCS does with its histories. [] account is not an official history produced by CIA, but Agency support and sponsorship of it would be obvious to any reader. Accordingly, we would propose to preface the account with a statement of responsibility and sponsorship as follows:

STAT

"This volume, though the product of official research, is the work of its author alone. It is to be construed as descriptive only and not as constituting the official position of the Director of Central Intelligence or of the Central Intelligence Agency."

7. There are two choices for reproducing the finished account. PSD has informally indicated to [] that printing would cost approximately \$5,200 and the offset

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method of reproduction approximately \$800. Despite the considerable variation in these two figures, I am in favor of having it printed because it would be more enduring and shorter, require fewer pages, and result in a more finished appearance than would the offset method.

8. It is difficult to know how many copies should be produced in order to meet the limited distribution discussed above. The cost factor involved in either printing or off-setting the work is not greatly affected by the number of copies produced. Inasmuch as producing too few copies to meet legitimate demands is much worse than ending up with a larger reserve of undistributed copies than one would normally prefer, I suggest that the producing run be set at 500. For purposes of comparison, 3,000 copies of Studies in Intelligence are currently being produced.

9. Recommendation: As discussed above, I recommend that [] account on the origins of the Agency be published as a classified document, that it be reproduced in 500 copies by OL/P&PD as a printed book, and that it be given distribution to other agencies having legitimate interest and such classified repositories as may be appropriate.

[]
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

Att.

CONCUR:

Chief, History Staff

Date

APPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

Date

Distribution:

0 - Adse (Ret. to DTR)

2 - DDA

1 - C/History Staff

2 - DTR

2 - OTR/II

- 3 -

OTR/II/ [] and (25 July 75)

13 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walter Elder, Chief, CIA History Staff
FROM : Jack B. Pfeiffer
SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins of CIA
REFERENCE : Memorandum for DDA from DTR, 29 July 75,
same subject.

Background

1. Per your request to me of 1 August 1975, I have examined Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency by [redacted]. It is unfortunate that the History Staff was not called on at a much earlier stage to provide guidance on the topic because a more "definitive" and certainly more professional history on the Origins of CIA -- including generous and adequately documented attributions to General William Donovan's contributions -- has been available since 1953. In December of that year [redacted] The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of National Policy, to 1950 appeared as the first issuance under the aegis of the CIA History Staff. [redacted] ten chapters cover 762 double-spaced pages, including footnotes; and the bulk of the first five chapters (345 pages) -- covering the wartime origins of the Agency through President Truman's signature on the National Security Act on 26 July 1947 -- were also published in five articles appearing in Studies in Intelligence between the Spring issue of 1968 and the Winter issue of 1969. Although [redacted] source references were not forwarded for review, I am sure that he must be aware of the [redacted] history.

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2. Whereas [redacted] in his first 345 pages covers not only the push by Donovan for the establishment of an independent centralized intelligence agency but also provides considerable substantial information about the estimative process during

the immediate post-war period, the [] history consumes 557 STATINTL single-spaced pages of text (excluding footnotes, appendixes, and other materials) in a grimly detailed, daily diary type of exposition of Donovan's every move in the organizational evolution of this period.

Discussion

3. Continued in its present form, it is improbable (contrary to the belief expressed by [] of OTR in the memo forwarding the history) that [] volume has "an excellent chance to be the definitive work on the subject and will earn the respect of all who read it." As objective history, the work is notably biased. The author's admiration for Donovan leads him to impute the motives of practically everyone who opposed Donovan on any issue related to the objectives and nature of the organization best suited to serve the nation's intelligence needs; the author is so entranced with details of Donovan's involvement that he has not separated the wheat from the chaff -- each episode involving a "major" issue receives equal treatment; and too frequently the author's personal prejudices toward given individuals show through.

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4. Editorially the history is a mess. Its use of dates is consistently imprecise (of all things, the exact date on which President Truman signed the National Security Act (26 July 1947) is omitted in the textual discussion concerning the actual signing); the quantity of minutiae is almost unbearable -- the first 55 pages (possibly 65 pp.) would be fine for a Donovan biography, but are at best marginal to CIA's origins; the work is repititious; and the numerous attempts to engage reader interest through the creation and destruction of straw men is unprofessional to say the least. Considering the problems of editing the text, one should look with fear and trepidation to the review of footnotes, sources, and other material intended for the "complete" version.

5. Both [] show that Donovan's insistence on a separate, centralized intelligence activity clearly made the function an integral part of US foreign policy formulation, but [] has placed considerably more emphasis on Donovan's concern that the intelligence Director receive "advice and assistance" from the representatives of the Departments of State, Army, and Navy rather than "advice and consent" of these representatives.

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6. One final general comment about the [] history is that the Epilogue is very much out of place in a history which could be construed by any stretch of the imagination as Agency-related. By this time, the author's opinion of former President Truman has already been made quite clear.

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Recommendations

7. Based on the above comments, I would recommend that no further work be done on the subject history. Three and a half years on this particular topic -- and the work not yet complete -- seems an inordinate waste of money. The source references, footnotes, and other related data should be gathered together and the complete package turned over to the CIA History Staff for retention as a manuscript for background use. As already mentioned, the bulk of the information in this history has appeared in print in a widely circulated, reputable intelligence publication, Studies in Intelligence. The pre-war background of COI, the more intimate view of the Donovan character, and details of the institutional infighting, can hardly be considered as significant additions to the literature of intelligence, particularly in view of the cost and effort which would be required to ready this volume for publication.

8. If the recommendation in Par. 7, above, is not acceptable to OTR and if that Office still wishes to publish the subject history then I would recommend that:

a. OTR negotiate a contract to turn the work over to a very competent and experienced editor with instructions to severely reduce the length, carefully check the documentation, eliminate the obvious author biases, and make the history conform to the standards and format established by the CIA History Staff.

b. When completed and approved by the CIA History Staff, the report should then be handled like any other of the volumes in the Agency historical program. Considering the availability and distribution of the already mentioned history by [] it would appear that three to five Xerox copies of the [] history would be adequate to meet the needs of the Agency; and its dissemination should be restricted to the

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Agency. By no stretch of the imagination should the ensuing volume be reproduced either by printing or by offset, nor should distribution be made outside the Agency.

c. If the procedures above are followed, the history will properly become a part of the official Agency history program and, as such, no disclaimers regarding the author's responsibility will be required.

9. To my knowledge, [redacted] if available, would be the most qualified editor for this task. I would suggest that at least a three-month contract would be required for this job. [redacted] or any other OTR editor should be made directly responsible to the CIA History Staff.

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10. As some indication of the need for thorough editing, I have attached a list of typographical errors, sins of omission and commission, and other questions that were noted in a quick review of the history.

[redacted]

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA History Staff

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Attachment

ATTACHMENT

Editorial Comments

Pp. 1-65. Practically all of this section should be deleted. The high points of Donovan's exposure to the British service should be incorporated in the subsequent discussion.

In this same segment it is apparent that the paucity of complete dates is going to plague the reader through the remainder of the history. Phrases such as "that same day," "two days later," and "the next night" appear in this and subsequent segments of the text. Also the spelling out of dates has been employed in numerous instances for no apparent reason. The most certain and positive assurance of correct dates is the format followed by the History Staff (and the Agency) of day, month, and year.

Page 70, par. 3. Loose and confusing paragraph referring to the initial Stephenson-Donovan contact. The paragraph refers to an incident detailed on p. 49 of this history, concerning an event of 1944. The paragraph should be rewritten and specific dates used. Also, if the comment about a Donovan "No" does not concern the reader of this history, when why introduce the issue?

Page 71, lines 1-2. " . . . asked by a CIA historian . . ."
Asked by a CIA historian in 1959?

Page 72, par. 1. "Big" and "Little" Bills -- who was which?

Page 72, par. 3, line 5. Refers to memorandum." STAT
Specify which memorandum.

Page 75, par. beginning "But did Donovan . . ." Should line 6 read as it does, "early in life he had taken a military bride"? Or should it read, "early in life he had taken the military as a bride"?

Pages 78/79. Omission at end of page 78.

Page 79, line 12. Identify STATINTL

Page 79. Use numerals throughout for dates.

Page 87, 4th par., last sentence and 5th par. Since 4th par. ends on speculation about the subject Stimpson had in mind, the reference in the 5th par. to "talking over the matter" is ambiguous. What matter? Also there is an incomplete quote beginning in the first sentence of the 5th par.

Page 89, par. 3, line 1. "Still on the third . . ." This is one of many examples of an incomplete and confusing date.

Page 115, line 5. Typo. "CIA" should be "CIAA."

Page 117, line 8 up. Refers to MacLeish as an "intermediary between Donovan and Rockefeller." Has Rockefeller been introduced to the reader prior to this?

Page 130, 1st complete par. Rather cavalier treatment of Mr. Wallace Phillips. Needs some better explanation than that the Brits "distrusted him."

Page 131, last sentence. This sounds like the "Perils of Pauline." End the last sentence after the word "chapter."

Page 191, line 4. Why the "/sic /" following the word "typing"?

Page 191, par. 3, line 1. Change from " . . . but nary a word" to " . . . but without a word."

Page 211, last word. "practise" to "practice."

Page 220, par. 2, line 6. " . . . members did not become seized of the subject." There have been innumerable seizures to this point, and many more follow. Overworking the word.

Page 246, sec. 4, par. 1. Makes very positive statements about Davis and Sherwood conversation with FDR, particularly in light of the comment that "there is no account of the discussion."

Pages 253-261. This reads like a daily diary for period from 16 February 1943 through 15 March 1943.

Page 263. The subtitle, "P. S. 1 -- Another Revision" is meaningless to the reader. What does P. S. 1 mean? P. S. 2 (p. 266)?

Page 266, last sentence subsection 7. The reference to the Field Manual completely fails to indicate if this was revised as recommended by the Joint Planners (p. 265) or whether Donovan completely ignored the recommendation in view of the revision of JCS 155/7/10.

Page 266, subsection 8, 1st sent. The date of the Donovan-Eisenhower-Davis luncheon needs to be restated for the benefit of the reader.

Page 270, pars. 1-4. Delete.

Page 282, line 1. Uses word "Bureau" to indicate Bureau of the Budget. BOB is the standard short reference inasmuch as most readers relate "Bureau" with the FBI.

Page 283, 2nd complete par. From "sumbitting" to "submittling."

Page 283, par. 3, lines 6-8. [] makes a straw man to show "how" a Donovan memorandum evolved -- [] focuses more on "what" evolved. STATINTL STATINTL

Page 311, line 1. From "intelligen8e actifities" to "intelligence activities."

Page 322, line 7 up. From "that and effort" to "that any effort"

Page 322, line 7 up. From "provokede" to "provokee."

Page 388, 2nd complete par., line 10. Is name [] correct? STATINTL

Page 388, last par., 1st sent. Delete phrase "whetting our appetites."

Page 404, line 7. "Depreciated" or "deprecated"?

Page 409, 1st complete par., last sent. Delete phrase "Recovering from the bouleversement."

Page 458. Another brief summary for the reader. If the history were less cluttered with insignificant detail, perhaps these frequent recapitulations would be unnecessary.

Page 469, par. 3, line 6. If the author believes that Donovan was ". . . master in his own house," why did he write several hundred pages telling of Donovan's trials and tribulations?

Page 470, par. 2, line 4. Reference to "Air Force" should read "Army Air Force."

Pages 472-3. The reference to the time that the Daily Summary was delivered to President Truman suggests that Arthur Krock of the NYT was a more reliable source than Montague who headed the Reports Staff. Suggest the author clarify this for the reader.

Page 474, line 11. Another reference to what pleased Arthur Krock. So what? Since the author is so interested in the minutia of origins, does the fact that Krock was commenting on classified publications indicate the origin of the NYT access to classified government documents?

Page 497, subsection 4, par. 2. This is one of a number of instances in which the author reverts to the newsman's technique of suggesting ulterior motive by innuendo, without evidence or indication of why such question is posed. In the referenced paragraph, lines 7-9 provide such an example with respect to a meeting on 8 January 1947 between Senator Vanderberg and Clark Clifford to discuss statutory legislation establishing the NIA and CIG. However, the facts subsequently reported by the author (pp. 497-98) provide a straightforward explanation of the Truman administration's position on the NIA-CIG issue.


Page 553 ff. Delete Epilogue.

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DD/A 75-39301



29 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM : Director of Training
SUBJECT : Publication of History on the Origins
of CIA

1. Action Requested: [] has now completed the text of his paper, "Donovan and CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA." This memorandum requests your approval to go forward with its publication in its classified form and your concurrence as to method of reproduction, number of copies, and their distribution as discussed below.

STAT

2. Background: For approximately three and one-half years, [] has been working on this project, which was worked out by the then Director of Training, Hugh Cunningham, with the advice of Larry Houston and the approval of Colonel White. The text runs to approximately 600 typed pages, comprising sixteen chapters and an epilogue. It consists of a narrative account of the high-echelon events in the field of intelligence during the years 1940-47 that culminated in the establishment of CIA. The volume will be footnoted and will include an appendix of basic documents on the establishment and definition of functions of COI, OSS, NIA, CIG and CIA. It will be illustrated with charts and photographs, and will include a chronology of major events and a bibliography.

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4. Staff Position: Many of the documents cited in the account were classified at their time of origin, although none is now higher than SECRET. Based upon the classification of the source materials, the volume will have to be classified SECRET, and I am requesting in a separate memorandum authority for [] to be eligible to classify at the TOP SECRET level in order that the exemption from downgrading of his SECRET history can be determined by him.

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9. Recommendation: As discussed above, I recommend that [] account on the origins of the Agency be published as a classified document, that it be reproduced in 500 copies by OL/P&PD as a printed book, and that it be given distribution to other agencies having legitimate interest and such classified repositories as may be appropriate.

[]
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

Att.

CONCUR:

Chief, History Staff

Date

APPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for
Administration

Date

Distribution:

0 - Adse (Ret. to DTR)

2 - DDA

1 - C/History Staff

2 - DTR

2 - OTR/II

-3-

OTR/II/[]nd (25 July 75)